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Mapping the Saratoga Campaign

Author Elizabeth Hancox

The Battle of Saratoga was a military encounter in northern New York in September 1777. The battle served as a major turning point in the American Revolutionary War by demonstrating the proficiency of the Continental Army and prompting France to initiate a crucial alliance with the United States. Continental Army General Horatio Gates led a decisive victory against troops led by British Army Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, foiling his plan to use the larger Saratoga Campaign to establish British control over the Hudson River Valley in New York. Burgoyne believed that occupying this area would sever the new American states, separating New England from the Middle and Southern states.1

In 1776, from Quebec, Burgoyne drafted a military strategy with Lord George Germain, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, that intended to divide American territories and halt the rebellion.2 As the centerpiece of what became the Saratoga Campaign, the Hudson River Valley was seen as a valuable territory for military purposes. British control of the region would mean that communication between the colonies to the north and those to the south would be effectively severed, making it impossible for them to join forces, or even for the northern colonies to feed their troops.3

Burgoyne’s plan was to lead his troops south from Montreal along the natural passageway created by Lake Champlain. The area’s topography can be seen in the 1777 Carte du théatre de la guerre entre les Anglais et les Américains (Map of the Theater of War Between the English and the Americans), made by Louis Brion de la Tour, a prolific eighteenth-century French cartographer and geographical engineer to King Louis XVI.4 The map demonstrates a consistent path of waterways and traversable valleys from Montreal to New York City. From Lake Champlain, the troops were to follow the Hudson River towards Albany.5 Burgoyne aimed to seize Albany, which would help to connect Quebec to the north and New York City to the south. A smaller force led by Barry St. Ledger was directed west from Montreal towards Lake Ontario, and then from Lake Ontario along the Mohawk River to Fort Stanwix, one hundred miles west of Albany. This expedition was intended as a backup means of capturing Albany. Finally, a third expedition was planned; British troops under General William Howe in New York City were to march north along the Hudson towards Albany. Thus, from Montreal to New York City, the British would create a line of garrisons that would enable them to split the American states in two sections, destroying the possibility of intercolonial cooperation.

Carte du théatre de la guerre entre les Anglais et les Américains
https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:3f462w71x/manifest.json

On June 17, 1777, Burgoyne’s army began marching south from Montreal.6 Along the way, the British army dropped men, weapons, and supplies in key areas to create a supply chain and a garrisoned north-south line. The first priority was to take control of Lake Champlain. Once achieved, Fort Ticonderoga at the north end of Lake George was next.7 On the American side, the defense of the northern department of the Continental Army and the Hudson River fell to generals Phillip Schuyler and Horatio Gates were responsible for the defense of the northern department of the Continental Army and the Hudson River. These generals remained unaware of Burgoyne’s plans to descend into New York.8

In August, Burgoyne sent a detachment across the Green Mountains to Bennington, Vermont, after receiving intelligence about a lightly guarded supply depot in the region.9 Burgoyne also received reports of strong Loyalist sentiment in the region. Hoping to attract support in the form of both supplies and men, Burgoyne sent soldiers, mostly German mercenaries, to Vermont under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Friederich Baum. The British expected an easy victory for Baum, unaware that New Hampshire militia Brigadier General John Stark would soon arrive with reinforcements. Stark secured a decisive American victory at the Battle of Bennington, costing Burgoyne nearly one thousand men.10

By the time Burgoyne arrived in Saratoga, his army had considerably decreased. On September 13–14, he crossed the Hudson, still committed to his goal of capturing Albany. Yet only a few miles ahead the Continental Army maintained a strongly fortified position on Bemis Heights, outnumbering Burgoyne. On September 19, Burgoyne attacked Gates’s army at Freeman’s Farm. Known as the First Battle of Saratoga, this engagement is documented in The encampment & position of the army under His Excy. Lt. Gl: Burgoyne (1777), made by Captain Lieutenant William Cumberland Wilkinson, an officer and engineer in the British Army during the Revolutionary War.11 Burgoyne claimed victory in this battle but suffered significant losses.12 On October 7, he challenged the Continental Army again at Bemis Heights in the Second Battle of Saratoga. The Americans forced the British back to their defensive position as they swiftly retreated north. Gates’s army pursued Burgoyne, and Stark’s forces eventually surrounded and trapped the British. From October 14–16, leaders negotiated and signed terms of “convention.”13

The encampment & position of the army under His Excy. Lt. Gl: Burgoyne
https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:q524nj835/manifest.json

Logistical flaws in Burgoyne’s campaign contributed to its failure. As the army marched south from Montreal, he should have considered that his forces would weaken. Additionally, establishing the north-south line of division required that troops would be left behind at certain points further decreasing the size of his army.14 Burgoyne intended to rely on the support of Loyalists in the region for crucial supplies like food, horses, and volunteers. He over estimated their assistance. Further complications hindered the feasibility of the Saratoga Campaign. General Howe focused on capturing Philadelphia rather than supporting Burgoyne’s attempt to capture Albany. Meanwhile, St. Leger engaged in a twenty-one day siege of Fort Stanwix that resulted in him retreating to Quebec.15 Burgoyne remained uninformed of the whereabouts of his colleagues, advancing towards Albany oblivious of the ongoing shortcomings of his plan.

The Saratoga Campaign marked a pivotal moment in the American Revolutionary War as it indicated the fortitude and competency of the Continental Army to the rest of the world. The British defeat helped to secure an alliance between the United States and France, which was formally signed months later in February 1778.16 In turn, the Franco-American alliance was instrumental in securing a victory for the American cause and the creation of the United States of America.

Bibliography

Bibliothèque nationale de France. “Brion de La Tour, Louis (1725?-1803).” Catalogue général. Accessed November 2, 2024.

“Burgoyne’s Campaign: June-October 1777 (U.S. National Park Service).” National Parks Service. U.S. Department of the Interior. Accessed November 2, 2024.

Clinton, Henry. The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents, edited by William B. Willcox. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954.

Corbett, Theodore. No Turning Point: The Saratoga Campaign in Perspective. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012.

Diamant, Lincoln. Chaining the Hudson: The Fight for the River in the American Revolution. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.

Ferling, John. Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Fort Ticonderoga. “Person Record: Wilkinson, William Cumberland.” Ticonderoga Online Collections. Accessed November 2, 2024.

Nickerson, Hoffman. The Turning Point of the Revolution. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1928.

Snow, Dean R. 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Weddle, Kevin J. The Compleat Victory: The Battle of Saratoga and the American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.


Footnotes

  1. Dean R. Snow, 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 6.

  2. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Wednesday, January 24, 1776, Library of Congress, accessed November 2, 2024, 82; John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 191.

  3. Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents, ed. William B. Willcox, 11.

  4. “Brion de La Tour, Louis (1725?-1803),” Catalogue général, Bibliothèque nationale de France, accessed November 2, 2024.

  5. Snow, 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga, 6-7.

  6. Snow, 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga, 8.

  7. Theodore Corbett, No Turning Point: The Saratoga Campaign in Perspective (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 4.

  8. Hoffman Nickerson, The Turning Point of the Revolution (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1928), 137.

  9. Kevin J. Weddle, The Compleat Victory: The Battle of Saratoga and the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 240.

  10. “Major General Philip Schuyler to George Washington,” August 19, 1777, in Founders Online: National Archives.

  11. “Person Record: Wilkinson, William Cumberland,” Ticonderoga Online Collections, Fort Ticonderoga, accessed November 2, 2024.

  12. Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 239.

  13. Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 240.

  14. Snow, 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga, 7.

  15. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Gansevoort to General Barry St. Leger, August 9, 1777, in Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library, accessed November 2, 2024.

  16. Treaty of Alliance Between the United States and France, February 6, 1778, In Milestone Documents in the National Archives, U.S. National Archives, accessed November 2, 2024.